The Evolution of the Middle Corridor and Its Implications for Kazakhstan's International Trade in the Aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine War

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Abstract

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the role of Middle Corridor raised and this paper examines Kazakhstan's trade turnover with ten partner countries that reflect the development prospects of the Middle Corridor. Using graphical methods, economic-statistical analysis, as well as explanatory analysis, the study identifies key factors influencing the development of the Middle Corridor. The research is based on data from the Bureau of National Statistics on the website of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan on investments and trade turnover from 2021 to 2025. This research argues that the growing interest in the Middle Corridor has influenced Kazakhstan's economic trajectory, which, in turn, is shaping the country's multi-vector foreign policy.

Keywords: Middle Corridor; Central Asia Trade; Transport Corridors; Logistics Efficiency; Regional Integration

1. Introduction

In the world, the Middle Corridor is becoming strategically important alternative to traditional transport corridors. Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine not only led to casualties, but also affected regional and global trade, disrupted logistics and transformed trade routes. Northern path bringing goods from China to Europe through Russia, there was a significant reduction in road traffic after international sanctions. Traffic shifted to the Middle Corridor route called as Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) (OECD, 2023). Before the recent geopolitical shifts, between 2019 and 2021, the Northern Land Route through Russia and Belarus has been processed about 86% of land trade between China and Europe, while the Middle corridor accounted for less than 1% of total traffic. During the same period, maritime transport dominated China-Europe trade, carrying 91% of the volume, whereas railway made up only 3.3% (World Bank, 2023).

The war gave an opportunity to the effective use of the Middle Corridor in 2022. According to the World Bank (2023), compared to the other years, trade along the route in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan increased by 45%, 45% and 72%, respectively. In spite of that, the Middle Corridor increased its importance, because of limited capacity the Middle corridor is still inferior to the Northern Corridor. Sanctions imposed on Russia led to the West blocking the Northern Corridor and increased the role of the Middle Corridor (Guliyev. V, 2022). Mainly, Kazakhstan is promoting Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). This route passes through Southeast Asia, China, Kazakhstan, Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Europe (TITR, 2024).

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

Figure 1. Alternative routes from China to Europe.

Source: bakuresearchinstitute.org

When it comes to the economy one of the world's largest countries, such as Kazakhstan, where the role of the Middle Corridor has significantly increased and started to attract investments from the EU and China. In 2022, the EBRD invested approximately 100 million USD to support Kazakhstan railways by local bond issue (Usov. A, 2022). There were different steps besides investments, as on 1 November 2023, the president of France Emmanuel Macron in his official visit to Kazakhstan, approved that Kazakhstan is a “natural bridge of autonomy between Europe and Asia” (Satubaldina. A, 2023). Later, in the same month, Kazakhstan also welcomed the Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council noted that “the Chinese side emphasized its willingness to contribute to the implementation of agreements concluded by the heads of state and to collaborate in ensuring the high-quality advancement of the One Belt, One Road Initiative” (Akhmetkali. A, 2023).

According to World Bank estimates, improved infrastructure could lead to 44% increase in cargo for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia by 2030, translating to direct gains (Sharashenidze. T, Cherkezishvili. G, 2025). Kazakhstan plays a leading role in rail freight transportation, accounting for over 80% of total traffic in Central Asia. The country has committed approximately USD 40 billion to infrastructure development under its 2030 plan, with a strong focus on modernizing railways, ports such as Aktau and Kuryk, and logistics hubs (OECD, 2023). Despite this, the structure of foreign direct investment (FDI) shows that the majority of Chinese investments in Kazakhstan exceeding USD 60 billion between 2000 and 2021 have been concentrated in the energy sector, while relatively little has been allocated to transport (Paterson, 2024). In recent years, Kazakhstan has experienced steady growth in FDI inflows, increasing from USD 20.96 billion in 2017 to USD 23.99 billion in 2023. However, this represents a slight decline compared to 2022, when FDI reached its peak at USD 28.17 billion.



Figure 2. FDI Net inflows (BoP, current US$), 2017-2023.

Source: World Bank, 2025

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine dramatically changed situation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well. Ankara has formed strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and these projects played a crucial role in the formation of connectivity between these countries. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an intergovernmental organization which was founded in 2009 to strengthen cooperation among Turkic language-speaking states. Its member states include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Hungary and Turkmenistan observer states. Turkmenistan is expected to become a full member in the near future. The OTS actively supports regional transport development. It has adopted cooperation agreements in this area and established a coordination council in 2013 to enhance connectivity among member states. In addition, the organization introduced the Turkic World Vision-2040, which aims to integrate member countries into regional and global supply chains, particularly through the development of the Middle Corridor (Tuba Eldem, 2022).

Figure 3. Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Source: Asia Briefing Ltd.

On August 2, 2022, the ministers of foreign affairs, economy, and transport of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan met in Tashkent to launch a new trilateral mechanism aimed at strengthening coordination and cooperation among the three Turkic-speaking countries, particularly in relation to the Middle Corridor. During the meeting, the parties expressed their support for linking the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway by the Middle Corridor (Pardaev K. et al., 2026) (Balbaa M. et al., 2024). This initiative is expected to create an integrated transport network across the three countries within the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) and facilitate the development of railway and highway infrastructure along the Zangezur Corridor. Once completed, this project will position the Middle Corridor as the shortest overland route connecting Asia and Europe (Tuba Eldem, 2022).

Figure 4. Zangezur Corridor.

Source: TRT World

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The relevance of transport corridors has increased significantly in recent years, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalation of geopolitical tensions after February 24, 2022. These developments, along with economic sanctions imposed on Russia, have disrupted traditional trade routes and affected the broader economic environment, including Central Asia's energy-dependent economies (Hess. M, 2024; Cornell. S, 2023).

The purpose of this study is to assess the role of the Middle Corridor and evaluates its impact on trade in Central Asia, particularly in light of ongoing changes in global trade and logistics systems.

The objective of this research is to examine the trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan with other countries from 2021 to 2025. Trough data, collected from the Bureau of National Statistics on the website of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan this research examines the trade relations of Kazakhstan with members of the European Union, China, the Central Asian states and the Caucasus.

The primary aim of this study to evaluate how the Middle Corridor has developed and performed. Second, this research examines how the Middle Corridor influence on trade of Central Asia. Third, this study suggests ways to strengthen the role of the Middle Corridor by offering a detailed understanding on importance of this route. Last, the present study uses qualitative and quantitative analysis. The data on economic integration covers the information on trade volumes, investment flows and infrastructure developments under the Middle Corridor initiative.

The article's first section offers a background of the study, Section 2 provides a literature review, while Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, followed by the conclusion in Section 5.

2. Literature Review

If the route receives new political attention, it should be developed into an alternative transit corridor, its multimodal nature places it in a structural position. Construction of the Middle Corridor potential and overcoming non-competitiveness lies in its ability become a trade route promoting economic and regional integration within the country. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as well as between these regions, Asia and Europe (OECD, 2023).

In recent years, the study of the Middle Corridor development has been a well-debated topic among researches in the past few years. There are numerous studies analyzed the main instruments that drive the Middle Corridor growth. For instance, the study of Vladimir Papava (2025) investigated transport corridors of Central Asia and explained interests of the Central Asian and European countries. Moreover, author counted all facing challenges of confrontational globalization. Results from this research showed that in today's confrontational globalization environment, developing diverse and reliable transport corridors has become crucial for maintaining resilient global supply chains. Central Asian countries play an important role by supporting multiple routes, including east-west and north-south connections, while balancing the interests of major powers. Therefore, shifting from competing "alternative" corridors to a more cooperative and complementary network is essential for stability and long-term economic growth. At the same time, other researchers as Tornike Sharashenidze, George Cherkezishvili (2025) analyzed the perspectives of the Middle Corridor, explaining that the prospects for the development of the Middle Corridor largely depend on investments from major global players the US, China and the EU. If the Middle Corridor is seen primarily as a vehicle for advancing Chinese strategic interests, the US may well distance itself from the project or even take steps to limit its progress approved researcher in this study. Another study of Assylbek Assylkhanov (2025) examined the Middle Corridor's impact on Kazakhstan. The study also included foreign policy, economic development and regional cooperation of Kazakhstan. The results of the study showed that the Middle Corridor has the potential to become a critical juncture in the connectivity of China and Europe in offering a route which bypasses Russia. The Middle Corridor is inferior to the Northern Corridor in terms of time, capacity and predictability. The study demonstrated that within the initiatives along the Middle Corridor, Kazakhstan could contribute to the sustainability of international connectivity in the region. The Middle Corridor is thus viewed as an alternative route for ensuring the connectivity between China and the EU, but most importantly for Kazakhstan, it has a vital impact on the development of the country's position in Eurasia. The political value and economic potential of the Middle Corridor can impact and shape the multi-vector foreign policy of the country, as well as provide the impulse for deeper cooperation between Kazakhstan and the South Caucasus states to ensure the country's links to Turkey and Europe further down the line.

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Subsequently, different analysts introduced and actively used many indicators (variables) related to the trade to examine the relationship between development of the Middle Corridor and trade indicators. Such as, Tornike Sharashenidze, George Cherkezishvili (2025) relied on secondary data obtained from international organizations and publicly available sources. This includes statistics on freight volumes, trade flows, and transport activity along the Middle Corridor, as well as macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and sectoral performance. They also used analytical reports and projections from institutions such as the World Bank and other regional organizations to assess future trends in corridor development. In addition, the study demonstrated comparative data reflecting changes in transport routes and trade patterns before and after recent geopolitical shifts, particularly since 2022. However, Tuba Eldem (2022) primarily relied on secondary data derived from international reports, policy documents, and publicly available statistics. The analysis included data on trade flows, freight volumes, and transport routes between Europe and Asia, with particular attention to changes following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Another study, Assylbek Assylkhanov (2025) actively used secondary data from official statistics, international databases and policy reports. The analysis illustrated data on Kazakhstan's foreign trade, transport volumes and transit flows along the Middle Corridor, as well as macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth and investment levels. In addition, the study of Vladimer Papava (2025) analyzed transport corridors in Central Asia using secondary data obtained from international reports, policy documents and publicly available statistics. The analysis includes information on trade flows, transport routes, and regional connectivity, as well as broader macroeconomic and geopolitical indicators.

Different econometric techniques have been used in different studies related to Middle Corridor and other controlled indicators (variables); likewise, Tornike Sharashenidze, George Cherkezishvili (2025) applied qualitative and descriptive analysis. The study illustrated secondary data from international organizations, examines trends in freight volumes, trade flows and applied a comparative approach to assess changes before and after recent geopolitical shifts. However, the research does not employ econometric modeling, instead focusing on policy-oriented and analytical evaluation. The research of Tuba Eldem (2022) used comparative data on transport infrastructure development, including railways, ports and multimodal logistics systems across Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey. The study also incorporated qualitative information on policy initiatives, regional cooperation agreements and geopolitical developments influencing connectivity in Eurasia. The research of Assylbek Assylkhanov (2025) is based on descriptive and qualitative analysis of secondary data rather than primary data collection or econometric modeling. And, last research of Vladimer Papava (2025) primarily qualitative and descriptive in nature, relying on comparative analysis and theoretical interpretation rather than primary data collection or econometric techniques.

Previously, a wide range of studies focused on the relationship between trade indicators and the development of the Middle Corridor, and vice versa. The foremost factors include GDP growth, employment, investment levels, sectoral development and FDI. Our study is different from others as we examine the development of the Middle Corridor using Kazakhstan's trade turnover from 2021 to 2025 as a control variable. We choose this variable from Bureau of National Statistics to study and take a panel data set from 2021 to 2025. The study used qualitative and quantitative analysis as a base to find statistical significance of the relationship between this indicator and development of the Middle Corridor. Additionally, many researchers from other countries used some of these indicators as controlled, therefore this study uses additional indicator (variable) such as trade turnover.

3. Research Methodology

This research used explanatory analysis. The data on economic integration covers the information on trade volumes under the Middle Corridor initiative. The information on the trade turnover of Kazakhstan with other countries, is accessed through the Bureau of National Statistics on the website of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Through these data, this research examines the trade relations of Kazakhstan with members of the European Union, China, the Central Asian states, and the Caucasus. This research paper will aim to contribute to the studies of Eurasian connectivity and the influence of the Middle Corridor on Kazakhstan.

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4. Results and Discussion

Table 1: Trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan by country from 2021 to 2025

Trade turnover	2021		2022		2023		2024		2025	
	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %
EU countries	30,073.27	29.6	41,875.39	30.9	41,302.83	29.6	48,839.33	34.4	38,353. 03	26.7
Russia	24,624.28	24.2	26,972.02	19.9	27,054.45	19.4	28,135.58	19.8	27,372.76	19.0
China	18,000.96	17.7	24,203.95	17.9	30,055.39	21.5	30,157.63	21.2	34,149.51	23.7
Kyrgyzstan	1,050.53	1	1,246.88	0.9	1,688.14	1.2	1,781.36	1.3	2,242.54	1.6
Tajikistan	1,163.78	1.1	1,384.86	1	1,129.97	0.8	1,213.54	0.9	1,235.81	0.9
Turkmenistan	254.21	0.2	438.69	0.3	562.95	0.4	555.75	0.4	508.02	0.4
Uzbekistan	3,833.91	3.8	4,921.94	3.6	4,417.92	3.2	4,130.59	2.9	4,801.62	3.3
Azerbaijan	332.24	0.3	463.39	0.3	556.70	0.4	533.97	0.4	470.73	0.3
Armenia	20.82	0	43.08	0	103.67	0.1	82.85	0.1	69.26	0
Georgia	88.02	0.1	600.76	0.4	293.53	0.2	189.66	0.1	184.45	0.1

Source: Bureau of National Statistics.

The data presented in Table 1 demonstrates significant changes in the structure of Kazakhstan's trade turnover over the period 2021-2025. One of the most notable trends is the changing role of major trading partners, particularly the European Union, China, and Russia.

The European Union remained Kazakhstan's largest trading partner throughout most of the period, with its share increasing from 29.6% in 2021 to a peak of 34.4% in 2024. In terms of volume, trade grew substantially from 30.1 billion USD in 2021 to 48.8 billion USD in 2024. However, in 2025, a sharp decline is observed, with the share dropping to 26.7% and total trade falling to 38.3 billion USD. This indicates a potential reorientation of Kazakhstan's trade away from European markets. In contrast, trade with China shows a consistent upward trend. China's share increased from 17.7% in 2021 to 23.7% in 2025, while trade volume nearly doubled from 18.0 billion USD to 34.1 billion USD over the same period. This steady growth highlights the increasing importance of China as a key trading partner and reflects a broader shift toward eastward trade flows.

Trade with Russia, while still significant, demonstrates a relative decline in importance. Its share decreased from 24.2% in 2021 to 19.0% in 2025, although trade volumes remained relatively stable at around 27-28 billion USD. This suggests that Kazakhstan is gradually diversifying its trade relationships and reducing reliance on traditional partners. At the regional level, trade with Central Asian countries shows moderate but uneven growth. Trade with Uzbekistan remained relatively stable in terms of share, fluctuating between 3.2% and 3.8%, while increasing in volume to 4.8 billion USD in 2025. Trade with Kyrgyzstan showed more noticeable growth, rising from 1.05 billion USD in 2021 to 2.24 billion USD in 2025, with its share increasing from 1.0% to 1.6%. Trade with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remained low and relatively stable, each accounting for less than 1% of total trade turnover.

Trade with the South Caucasus countries, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, remained limited throughout the period. Azerbaijan maintained a relatively stable share of around 0.3-0.4%, while Georgia

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experienced fluctuations, peaking in 2022 before declining in subsequent years. Trade with Armenia remained minimal. Despite their strategic importance as transit countries, trade volumes with these countries are still underdeveloped.

Table 2: Mutual trade by EAEU countries from the period of January to July in 2024 and 2025

Trade turnover	**2024 (Jan-Jul)**		**2025 (Jan-Jul)**	
	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %	Total, USD, mln	Country's share in total trade turnover, %
Belarus	489.35	3,1	612.21	3,8
Russia	14,397.92	91.1	14,421.20	88.9
Kyrgyzstan	893.89	5.7	1,163.12	7.2
Armenia	17.87	0.1	28.67	0.2

Source: Bureau of National Statistics.

The data presented in Table 2 illustrates the dynamics of Kazakhstan's mutual trade with EAEU countries over the period January-July 2024 and 2025. The comparison reveals both growth trends and structural imbalances in regional trade relations. Trade with Belarus shows moderate growth, increasing from 489.35 million USD in 2024 to 612.21 million USD in 2025. Its share in total trade turnover also rose from 3.1% to 3.8%, indicating a strengthening of trade ties between the two countries. Trade with Russia remains the dominant component of Kazakhstan's trade within the EAEU. The total trade volume slightly increased from 14,397.92 million USD in 2024 to 14,421.20 million USD in 2025. However, despite the relatively stable volume, the reported share of 88.9% in 2025 suggests a strong concentration of trade with Russia, significantly exceeding other EAEU partners. Trade with Kyrgyzstan demonstrates noticeable growth, rising from 893.89 million USD in 2024 to 1,163.12 million USD in 2025. Its share also increased substantially from 1.1% to 7.2%, reflecting an expansion of bilateral trade and strengthening regional economic integration within Central Asia. Similarly, trade with Armenia increased from 17.87 million USD to 28.67 million USD, with its share rising from nearly zero to 0.2%. Although the overall volume remains relatively small, the growth trend indicates a gradual expansion of trade relations.

The results show a growing share of trade with the European Union and China, which strengthens the importance of the East-West transport axis and supports the role of the Middle Corridor as a strategic alternative to traditional routes. At the same time, the declining or fluctuating share of trade with Russia indicates a gradual shift away from northern corridors. However, the findings also reveal that intra-regional trade within Central Asia and the South Caucasus remains relatively low and unstable. This limits the full realization of the Middle Corridor's potential, as regional demand is a key factor for sustainable corridor development. These results are consistent with previous studies. For example, Tornike Sharashenidze and George Cherkezishvili (2025) emphasize that the Middle Corridor has strong potential but faces structural challenges such as limited infrastructure and weak regional coordination. Similarly, Tuba Eldem (2022) and Balbaa et al. (2022) highlights that geopolitical changes, including the Russia-Ukraine war, have increased the importance of alternative transport routes, including the Middle Corridor. Vladimer Papava (2025) also notes that confrontational globalization has accelerated the need for diversified transport corridors in Central Asia. In addition, Assylbek Assylkhanov (2025) points out that the development of the Middle Corridor contributes not only to economic growth but also to shaping Kazakhstan's foreign policy and regional cooperation.

5. Conclusion

This study examined that Kazakhstan's trade structure is increasingly aligned with the geographical logic of the Middle Corridor. The growth of trade with the EU and China, combined with stable regional trade in Central Asia and gradual increases with Caucasus countries, supports the corridor's development as a viable and strategically important route. Moreover, the short-term data suggests that while external trade with major partners such as the EU and China is strengthening supporting the growth of East-West transit the relatively weak and inconsistent trade within Central Asia and the Caucasus limits the corridor's development as a fully integrated regional trade route. To fully realize the potential of the Middle Corridor, it is essential to increase intra-regional trade and strengthen economic links among participating countries. This would generate stable cargo flows, improve route efficiency, and make the corridor more attractive for long-term investment.

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This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the analysis is based on descriptive and comparative methods, without the use of econometric models, which limits the ability to establish causal relationships between the development of the Middle Corridor and trade dynamics. Second, the research relies on secondary data obtained from official statistical sources, which may contain limitations in terms of accuracy, consistency, or completeness. Third, the time period of the analysis (2021-2025) is relatively short and coincides with significant global disruptions, including the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions, which may affect the stability and generalizability of the results.

Based on the findings of this study, several practical and academic recommendations can be made. Realizing the Middle Corridor's potential requires to transform it into a major trade route. Moreover, there some recommendations for the future developing of the Middle Corridor (OECD, 2023):

1. Regional integration: creating traffic and demand on the route will largely stem from increased regional economic and trade integration.

From a private sector's perspective, the Middle Corridor is currently less attractive than other alternative routes. Limited traffic on the route largely reflects the absence of demand for goods from Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as the relatively low level of intermediate import demand from these countries. As a result, the corridor is mainly used as an East-West transit route, while regional trade links and West-East traffic are largely insignificant.

Increased regional economic and trade integration could pave the way for better GVC integration and the development of the Middle Corridor into a major trade route connecting Asia to Europe. The disruptions to global trade caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and subsequently by Russia's war on Ukraine, are an opportunity for both Central Asia and the Caucasus to play a larger role in global supply and value chains. Cost and efficiency gains and increased market size for regional production following from deepened regional economic integration would create regional demand and incentivize private sector participation in Middle Corridor development.

2. Trade facilitation: reforms should focus on advancing digitalization and harmonization of border procedures and permit requirements.

Cumbersome transit and trade procedures add to border point congestion and result in inconsistent and unpredictable transit and crossing times, further reducing the route's attractiveness. Despite trade facilitation reforms in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey, a regional approach to the route's development is missing. In particular, the Middle Corridor's attractiveness for the private sector suffers from an overlay of multiple and unharmonized license and permit requirements, increasing transit time and cost. Deficient border customs capacity and a lack of cooperation among customs agencies along the route also lead to repetitive inspections and delays, creating congestion when traffic increases.

3. Infrastructure: additional investments are needed to improve multimodality across the route and port and vessel capacity in the Caspian Sea.

Targeted adjustments to the infrastructure network along the Middle Corridor can translate into increased traffic in the short and medium term. In recent years, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey have been modernizing and developing their road, rail, and maritime infrastructure. However, congestion at border points and seaports remains high, and reduces the route's attractiveness. In particular, container and vessel fleet capacity are not in line with railway freight volumes, leading to delays in seaports reinforced by the low level of port infrastructure automation around the Caspian Sea and lacking multimodal infrastructure to avoid multiple loading and unloading for ferry journeys. At border points the issue is similar.

4. Transnational co-operation: a common regional approach is required to implement these reforms, and deepen regional economic and trade integration.

Despite intensified regional cooperation to support the development of the route in recent years, regional competition and limited co-ordination have prevented a joint approach so far. Reform and investment efforts to address main bottlenecks have remained largely national so far, and implementation suffers from limited co-ordination both between levels of government at the national level and across countries. In addition, while the private sector has been very active in working towards common standards and addressing recurrent issues along the route, it has been mainly left out from strategic discussions about the route's development, both at the national and regional levels. Developing the Middle-Corridor's attractiveness will require improved co-ordination across national government levels and increased regional co-ordination. Achieving sustainable improvements in trade flows will require a combination of national initiatives and regional co-operation.

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5. Digitalization of transport and logistics systems.

Accelerating the digitalization of transport and logistics processes within the Middle Corridor can significantly increase its efficiency and attractiveness. This includes the introduction of unified digital platforms, electronic document management (for example, e-CMR, and electronic customs), real-time cargo tracking and data exchange between participating countries. Enhanced digital integration will reduce delays, increase transparency, and reduce transaction costs, thereby making the corridor more competitive for international trade.

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