



Reliable Data Communication Model for Fog Computing

Reem Atassi^{1,*}, Aditi Sharma^{2,3}

¹College of Computing Information Technology, American University in the Emirates, UAE

²IEEE Senior Member, Parul University, Vadodara, India

³Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Parul Institute of Technology, India

Emails: ratassi@hct.ac.ae; aditi11121986@gmail.com

Abstract

To maintain data privacy and control who has access to what in the cloud, attribute-based encryption might be utilized. Attribute security is violated when apparent qualities are introduced to the encrypted message to assist people to identify necessary details in vast systems. To offer an effective attribute-based access control with an authorized search strategy, this research expands the anonymous key-policy attribute-based encryption (AKP-ABE) to provide fine-grained data retrieval while safeguarding attribute privacy (EACAS). In EACAS, data users may generate the trapdoor using the secret key supplied by data owners and conduct searches based on access restrictions to get the relevant data. Cryptographic protocols and trapdoor generation use a synthetic property devoid of syntactic significance to provide an attribute-based search on the exported encoded information in the fog. Data owners may implement granular access control on their outsourced data by establishing the search criteria that will be used by data consumers to locate relevant content based on protected attributes. We show that compared to the state-of-the-art methods, EACAS requires less time and space to process and store data.

Keywords: Access control; authorized search; cloud storage; data sharing; key-policy attribute-based encryption.

1. Introduction

IoT device data may be sent to the fog for storage and analysis via a number of IoT management services, such as Amazon AWS IoT [1] and Google Cloud IoT Core [2]. In cloud-based management systems, asymmetrical and complex trust linkages between IoT devices from several trust domains are typical. As a result, it could be difficult to control access to outsourcing IoT data from a unified security perspective. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is one solution since it provides rules-based, granular access control to encrypted data in a safe manner [3]. In ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4], the encryptor is able to specify the ciphertext's access policy using a collection of descriptors. Even if an attacker obtains a decryption key.

Cloud-based management of the Internet of Things (IoT) requires the resolution of various issues before CP-ABE may be utilized for this purpose. More characteristics initially cause the ciphertext to grow in size [5, 6, 7]. This might be a significant challenge for IoT systems due to the vast range of capabilities needed for IoT applications and services [8]. CPABE approaches, which only permit ciphertexts of fixed size [9, 10, 11, 12], are insufficient to ensure the security of IoT systems.

CP-main ABE's benefit is that it may be used on battery-powered mobile devices like laptops since the majority of the computational work is placed on the decryptor (rather than the encryptor). Recent studies have shown that an unauthorized cloud provider may decode a user's communication. Because of this, the ciphertext amount was unreadable. Decryption that can be outsourced [5] and cipher text of fixed size Advanced Behavioral Economics (ABE) techniques are only two examples of state-of-the-art technologies that might be combined to address these issues. The problem cannot be fixed using the outsourced decoding approach [5] due to the use of a key blindness methodology. The cloud may return partly decrypted data disguised by z if sensitive information is veiled using a (secret) blinding factor, such as z , and then sent back to the user. Because of this, finding it just requires z . However, this method includes extra material critical to decryption that is concealed from the user in the continuously encrypted text [11]. The user can never be certain they have successfully retrieved the plaintext as a result.

A technique to concurrently create compact secure messages and subcontractable decryption was developed by Li et al. [16]. However, decoding a cipher text is only possible for users for whom traits match those in the access policy, which severely limits the ability to govern access. Finally, if users give their private keys to people who are not authorized to do so, there is a risk of improper usage of secret keys. As a result, both authorized and unauthorized users may engage in inappropriate exchanges of secret keys. Anybody with an internet connection might potentially get access to the data gathered by IoT gadgets. Using ABE that could be traced has been suggested for the leakage problem in past research. The primary limitation of most key-tracing algorithms is that they only seek the original key-holders. If that's the case, dishonest individuals may still access your cloud data by giving out their private keys. Key leaking cannot be prevented only through traceability since there are practical methods for recovering keys, such as session hijacking analysis. They may still access and recover the information up until the key expires, but this is not a workable solution to the shared (or leaked) key problem. An efficient system for Authentication that represents existing issues is crucial for fog IoT management solutions. A safe and efficient IoT data management system that functions in the cloud's fog environment is made possible by our innovative CPABE architecture. If implemented, the proposed method may efficiently manage storage and capacity while also tracking down and punishing saboteurs who disseminate their private keys in a dishonest manner. By providing the cloud with a client transformation key, It might be able to outsource the majority of the decryption-related computation. To prevent the unauthorized bringing of the public digital key, the Fog authorized the digital key, decrypts the encrypted message partially using the transformation key of the digital key, and then returns the partially decoded output. Remember that the attribute key and the transformation key are closely coupled and that only the original owner of the attribute key has the ability to decrypt the partly encrypted text and return it to normal. No one else can decode the message using the public keys. As opposed to summarising, the recommended method may survive assaults like key misuse that are challenging to meticulously decipher.

2. Related Work

These issues may be remedied by using constant-size ciphertext [11] and outsourceable decryption [5] in ABE systems. However, the outsourced decryption approach [5] does not work because of a key binding mechanism. Using a (secret) blinding factor called z , the user may obscure their own private key from prying eyes. As a result, the cloud may do a blindfolded key decryption and provide the original, unmasked plaintext. Because of this, finding it just requires z . However, when using this technique, not only is z concealed from the user but so are other crucial parts of the constant-size ciphertext [11]. Because of this, the user can no longer extract the plaintext with any degree of certainty. Li et al. [16] developed a method to accomplish both a compact ciphertext and a decipherment that may be subcontracted.

Data from IoT sensors may be routed to either centralized or decentralized cloud servers for storage, transit, and processing, making these systems vulnerable to both internal and external assaults. The proliferation of IoT has been greatly aided by cloud computing's vast capacity for data storage and processing. To protect IoT data from hackers and other bad actors, many encryption methods have been put into place. Mathematics on encrypted data is a challenging task. Full-homomorphism encryption might be implemented using a semi-trusted server. It's challenging to design a distributed system for exchanging data across IoT devices. To solve this problem, a completely homomorphic encryption system tailored to cloud-based IoT applications was designed. Semi-trusted servers allow homomorphic multiplications to be calculated without first decrypting the input. The term "e-Health" is used to refer to a healthcare infrastructure that is based on the use of the Internet and other networked infrastructure. For this analysis, we looked at how the usage of intelligent technologies in healthcare has evolved from 2017 to,

specifically focusing on how cloud computing and IoT devices have affected this trend. E-health refers to the collection and analysis of health information from electronic sources with the purpose of improving patient care in terms of diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. The Internet can protect consumers and encourage them to take an active part in their own healthcare decision-making via the centralization of medical data and e-Health research. Low rates of e-Health adoption increase the likelihood that individuals may encounter bogus claims. The potential, benefits, and challenges of establishing IoT-cloud-based health systems are assessed from a number of different viewpoints. Intelligence-driven goal-finding and innovative application development have led to some exciting new combinations in the Internet of Things, cloud computing, and eHealth systems. The Internet of Things raises a variety of concerns about the protection of private information and sensitive data. Challenges facing the Internet of Things include insufficient security measures, user illiteracy, and ubiquitous active device monitoring. As we examine past IoT systems and security measures, we can learn more about (a) different types of security and privacy worries, (b) current security solutions, and (d) the best privacy models required and suitable for different tiers of IoT-driven applications. In this research, we laid out the layered structure of the IoT and identified its numerous parts, from the most fundamental to the most complex safeguards for user data. The proposed cloud/edge system for the Internet of Things has been implemented and validated.

Internet of Things nodes is supported by Amazon Web Services (AWS) Virtual Machines. The Raspberry Pi 4 hardware kit hosted by Amazon Web Services was used to build the intermediate layer of the Green grass Edge Environment (edge). Our approach is built on top of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) IoT cloud infrastructure (the cloud). The management sessions and other security measures ensured that user data remained secure at all times. We built security certificates to allow for encrypted communication between the different nodes in the proposed cloud/edge-enabled IoT architecture. Threats to the security of the cloud, edge, and IoT layers might be mitigated by adopting the suggested system architecture and using current best practices in information security. It's safe to say that the combination of CC and the IoT has had a major impact on contemporary medical practice (IoT). Due to the increasing data output from IoT devices, a centralized data storage and processing infrastructure such as the CC is becoming more important. As more people and IoT devices depend on remote access to computer and networking resources, the need for security in CoT is increasing.

This is a very crucial case for preserving people's right to internet anonymity. That the CoT is giving security and privacy more attention is clear from this. In this article, we looked at the problems and possible answers around data security and privacy. Research on the CoT's underlying architecture and its present uses has been undertaken toward this end. Challenges and impediments that have still to be addressed, as well as other concerns connected to privacy and security, are also explored.

3. Proposed Work

We offer a secure and effective solution for handling IoT data in the cloud using our state-of-the-art CPABE architecture. The proposed method may identify traitors who unintentionally release private keys while also efficiently controlling memory and bandwidth. Cloud services may be able to outsource a large portion of the computation needed for decryption if they provide each user with their own unique transformation key.

In order to avoid unapproved shares by the recipient who has been compromised, the fog verifies the identification of the key holder, decodes some of the encrypted messages by employing the recipient's transition, and returns the result. You should be aware that the original owner of an attribute key is actively taking part in the process since only he is capable of decrypting plaintext. The plaintext cannot be used while using the shared (or compromised) keys. The owner of the data first has to create an account on a remote server and authorize access. The file will be encrypted and uploaded to the cloud server when the owner receives permission from the cloud data owner. The owner will then request the information key and secret for the file he submitted. To do deduplication in the cloud, the file must first be produced using unique keys. Users may only view, download, and otherwise interact with submitted files if the data's owner has granted them access. The cloud storage service is run and maintained by a cloud server. Files containing sensitive information are encrypted before being uploaded to the cloud, where approved End users may view, edit, and interact in real-time. Users will require both the content key and the master secret key to access the joint data files. The cloud will also maintain track of all connected transactions and attacks, in addition to easing access. Key Authority is contacted by the customer when they need a secret key and content key. KeyAuthority can see any file and retrieve its associated content key, master

secret key, and data owner details. Cloud-based information is inaccessible without a user account and associated credentials.

The person's account has been given access by the cloud, which will now confirm their registration. The private key and the Information key must first be requested by the user prior to being able to view the file. Users are free to search and download files as the registered owner permits it.




Figure 1: Flow chart

The system model is utilized in the area of medical pharmacy, which consists of the typical entities of physicians, patients, and pharmacy workers (Figure 1). The improvement of the Identity Provider (IDI) among the end users may consist of the fact that they are either the owners of the data or the person who requested the data, together with any cloud or fog nodes. The responsibility of approving the end users who would be utilizing the dynamic identity that was generated by the identity issuer lies with the identity issuer. The authorization procedure begins with the identity issuer so that the end users and the server may begin communicating with one another.




Figure 2: Processing structure of CofTS architecture

The person who owns the data is the one who is responsible for generating the Access Control List (ACL) for any files that they upload to the cloud server. The owner of the data has requested that their file be stored. The level of confidentiality required for the file will determine whether a private or public cloud environment is appropriate. The RSA technique must be used in order for the data owner to generate a signature for their ACL.

As a result, the network is protected against the assault that was carried out by the hostile insider. It is necessary for the owner of the data to submit the files and corresponding ACL to the server and the Identity Issuer. The patients are the only subjects included in the data owner field attributes.

If the files are posted to a public cloud, the data requester will obtain the data they requested very instantly. If the data is located in a private cloud, the request must be handled via the identity provider. The secret key and the private key of the data owner are used to encrypt the files when the identity issuer has made contact with the data owner and obtained both keys. The data requester field comprises the qualities of both patients and physicians, as well as workers of pharmacies.

The natural features of an IoT system are its complicated connections between a huge number of devices while the provision of data and services is specific to application domains.

$$f = \min \sum_{i=1}^n \left\{ w_{it} \sum_{j=1}^m [s_{ij}(t) * T_{ij}(t)] + w_{ie} \sum_{j=1}^m [s_{ij}(t) * E_{ij}(t)] \right\}$$

where (C1) and (C2) are the constraints on the task scheduling decision, namely, that each task can only be allocated to a fog node; (C3) are the delay constraints on each task; (C4) is the energy consumption constraints on each task; (C5) is the delay weight constraints on each terminal equipment; and (C6) are the energy consumption weight constraints on each terminal equipment. The fog node is built into the system in the middle of the cloud and the end users.

$$(C5): \begin{cases} w_{it} = 0.7 \\ w_{ie} = 0.3 \end{cases}, a_i = 1, i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

$$(C6): \begin{cases} w_{it} = 1 \\ w_{ie} = 0 \end{cases}, a_i = 0, i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

In point of fact, the fog node is thought of as a basis that is closer to the cloud server, which is something that is implemented on the side of the end user. For increased safety and productivity, the fog node performs tight surveillance on the devices used by end users.

$$(C1): s_{ij}(t) \in \{0, 1\}, i = 1, 2, \dots, n; j = 1, 2, \dots, m$$

$$\begin{aligned} (C2): s_{i1}(t) + s_{i2}(t) + \dots + s_{im}(t) &= 1, i = 1, 2, \dots, n \\ (C3): s_{ij}(t) * T_{ij}(t) &\leq T_{i,max}, i = 1, 2, \dots, n; j = 1, 2, \dots, m \\ (C4): s_{ij}(t) * E_{ij}(t) &\leq E_{il}, i = 1, 2, \dots, n; j = 1, 2, \dots, m \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the identity issuer uses dynamic user identities to perform mutual authentication between the fog node and end users. This takes place between the two groups. On both the end-user and fog node sides of the mutual authentication implementation, distinct pseudo-random number generators are employed. This ensures that both sides of the authentication process are secure. This makes the system more trustworthy while increasing its overall efficiency.

Results and Discussion

The performance of the proposed work MATID, MUAP, and TMAT have been evaluated in terms of Computation cost, mutual authentication time, and trends in Upload & download time, under the deployment of a desktop machine with processor specifications of Intel Core i5 processor with 3.80 GHz and 6 MB cache in Windows 7 Enterprise which is provisioned as a remote end and as a virtual machine on Amazon EC2 and Heroku. The cryptography part which holds the critical base in the proposed system is based on java pairing-based cryptography, which is used over 256 or 512 bits. The experimental setup for the MedicApp application has been implemented using Angular with NodeJs as the front-end and MongoDB as the back-end database. The acquired findings are displayed in Figs. 2 through 5.




Figure 3: Hacker

To evaluate the performance of the MATID, various login requests were made from the various browsers. The mutual authentication time has been compared using MATID with the graphical-based authentication scheme. The true positive rate has been measured for the replay attack, stolen verifier attack, and impersonation attack using MATID with a graphical-based authentication scheme. The true positive rate is measured by the number of true positives divided by the total number of actual positives




Figure 4: Proceedings

The session key for the mutual authentication from the fog user side, using pseudo-random numbers which were generated by the Mersenne Twister Generator, has been analyzed and the results of 100 values have been plotted. The session key for the mutual authentication from the fog node side, using pseudo-random numbers which were generated by the Linear Congruential Generator, has been analyzed and the results of 100 values have been plotted.




Figure 5: Examine the Time Delay outcomes

The average time taken for each session key set has been recorded and compared with each other to measure the lag in time. The session key has been generated by using the algorithm SHA-256. The average session key generation time for session key generation on the fog user side (SKFU) was 16.429 milliseconds and session key generation on the fog node side (SKFN) was 11.318 milliseconds over 100 values.




Figure 6: Look at the Output Data

The time taken to complete a mutual authentication process using various algorithms has been recorded. The RSA algorithm has taken 24,400 milliseconds, the ECC algorithm has taken 6,670 milliseconds, the lightweight mutual authentication protocol has taken 1,580 milliseconds, and TMAT has taken 1,108 milliseconds.

Future Scope and Conclusion

Alternatives for fog the innovative CP-ABE technique may be useful for Internet administration. The recommended approach saves money on communication expenses since Sensor nodes produce an encrypted message of a fixed size regardless of the number of characteristics. Under the proposed method, user devices running on battery power might offload most of the decryption work to the cloud. By tracing back where a key came from, you can be sure that only the key's rightful owner may decrypt an encrypted file, protecting it from those who may have gained access to it illegally. Attacks using forensically intractable key misuse are widespread in IoT systems, but the proposed method is resilient to them.

References

- [1] "AWS IoT." AWS. <https://aws.amazon.com/ko/iot>. (accessed Dec. 17, 2019)
- [2] "Cloud IoT Core." Google Cloud. <https://cloud.google.com/iotcore>. (accessed Dec. 17, 2019)
- [3] A. Sahai, B. Waters, "Fuzzy identity-based encryption," *Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT*, 2005, pp. 457–473.
- [4] J. Bettencourt, A. Sahai, B. Waters, "Ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption," In *IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP'07)*, 2007, pp. 321–334.
- [5] M. Green, S. Hohenberger, B. Waters, "Outsourcing the decryption of ABE ciphertexts," In *USENIX Security Symposium*, Vol. 2011, No. 3, 2001.
- [6] J. Lai, R. H. Deng, C. Guan, J. Weng, "Attribute-based encryption with verifiable outsourced decryption," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, 8(8), 2013, pp. 1343–1354.
- [7] S. Lin, R. Zhang, H. Ma, M. Wang, "Revisiting attribute-based encryption with verifiable outsourced decryption," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, 10(10), 2015, pp. 2119–2130.
- [8] S. Sours, I. P. Barco, P. Zwickl, I. Gojmerac, G. Bianchi, G. Carrozzo, "Towards the cross-domain interoperability of IoT platforms," In *European Conference on Networks and Communications (EuCNC)*, 2016, pp. 398–402.

- [9] C. Chen, Z. Zhang, D. Feng, "Efficient ciphertext policy attribute based encryption with constant-size ciphertext and constant computation-cost," In *Provable Security*, 2011, pp. 84–101.
- [10] C. Hahn, H. Kwon, J. Hur, "Efficient attribute-based secure data sharing with hidden policies and traceability in mobile health networks," *Mobile Information Systems*, 2016.
- [11] Z. Zhou, D. Huang, Z. Wang, "Efficient privacy-preserving ciphertext-policy attribute based-encryption and broadcast encryption," *IEEE Transactions on Computers*, 64(1), 2015, pp. 126–138.
- [12] Z. Zhou, D. Huang, "On efficient ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption and broadcast encryption," In *Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security*, 2010, pp. 753–755.
- [13] Shang, W., Bann's, A., Liang, T., Wang, Z., Yu, Y., Afanasyev, A., and Zhang, L., "Named data networking of things," In *IEEE First International Conference on Internet-of-Things Design and Implementation (IoTDI)*, 2016, pp. 117–128.
- [14] Gibb, J., Buyya, R., Maurice, S., and Palaniswami, M., "Internet of Things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions," *Future generation computer systems*, 29(7), 2013, pp. 1645–1660.
- [15] Ghose, A., Biswas, P., Bhaumik, C., Sharma, M., Pal, A., and Jha, A., "Road condition monitoring and alert application: Using in vehicle smartphone as internet -connected sensor," In *IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Workshops)*, 2012, pp. 489–491.
- [16] Li, J., Sha, F., Zhang, Y., Huang, X., and Shen, J., "Verifiable outsourced decryption of attribute-based encryption with constant ciphertext length," *Security and Communication Networks*, 2017.
- [17] Y. Jiang, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, F. Guo, "Ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption against key-delegation abuse in fog computing," *Future Generation Computer Systems*, 78, 2017, pp. 720–729.
- [18] Y. B. Saied, A. Livereaf, D. Zeglache, M. Laurent, "Lightweight collaborative key establishment scheme for the Internet of Things," *Computer Networks*, 64, 2014, pp. 273–295.
- [19] M. J. Hinek, S. Jiang, R. Safavi-Naini, S. F. Shahandashti, "Attribute-based encryption with key cloning protection," *International Journal of Applied Cryptography*, 2(3), 2012, pp. 250–270.
- [20] S. Yu, K. Ren, W. Lou, J. Li, "Defending against key abuse attacks in KP -ABE enabled broadcast systems," In *International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Systems*, 2009, pp. 311–329.
- [21] J. Li, Q. Huang, X. Chen, S. S. Chow, D. S. Wong, D. Xie, "Multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with accountability," In *Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security*, 2011, pp. 386–390.
- [22] Z. Liu, Z. Cao, D. S. Wong, "Blackbox traceable CP-ABE: how to catch people leaking their keys by selling decryption devices on ebay," In *Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security*, 2013, pp. 475–486.
- [23] J. Ning, Z. Cao, X. Dong, L. Wei, X. Lin, "Large universe ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with white-box traceability," In *European Symposium on Research in Computer Security*, 2014, pp. 55–72.
- [24] G. Yu, Z. Cao, G. Zeng, W. Han, "Accountable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme supporting public verifiability and nonrepudiation," In *International Conference on Provable Security*, 2016, pp. 3–18.
- [25] J. King, Z. Cao, X. Dong, J. Gong, J. Chen, "Traceable CP -ABE with short ciphertexts: how to catch people selling decryption devices on eBay efficiently," In *European Symposium on Research in Computer Security*, 2016, pp. 551–569.